Contract Theory, Organizational Economics, Behavioral Economics
Recent Research Interests
My research interests focus on the fields of behavioral contract theory. My research includes investigations into design of incentive mechanisms and organizational structures.
- “Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences,” with Takeshi Murooka, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 25, pp.958-989, 2016.
- “Public Infrastructures, Production Organizations, and Economic Development,” with Ken Tabata, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 38, pp.330-346, 2013.
- “Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion,” with Kimiyuki Morita, Takeshi Murooka, and Masahiro Ogawa, Economics Letters, Vol. 121, pp.35–38, 2013.
- “Formal and Relational Incentives in a Multitask Model,” International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.26, Issue 3, pp.380-394, 2006.
- “Peer Pressure and Incentives,” Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol.58, No.1, pp.51-60, 2006.