Mechanism Design, Social Choice Theory, Institution Design
Recent Research Interests
My research interests are in mechanism design theory, which is an application of game theory to institution design. The theory investigates the possibility of designing institutions (mechanisms) that make it possible for a social planner to realize desirable allocations of goods or collective decisions when agents are strategic and their preferences or opinions over all possible outcomes are private information. Applications of the theory include the designs of voting rules, rules for public goods provision, auction procedures, and matching markets. My current research explores the design of rules for selecting prize-winners or persons undertaking tasks in an impartial way, with the goal of finding reasonable selection rules that make it possible to always select suitable persons by avoiding strategic misrepresentation of opinions by selfish agents.
- “Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes.” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.95, pp.41-46. （Available online: 17 December 2015）
- “Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money.” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol.44, pp.195-207 (joint with Miki Kato and Shinji Ohseto). （Available online: 13 May 2014）
- “Impartial nomination correspondences.” Social Choice and Welfare, Vol.43, pp.47-54 (joint with Shinji Ohseto).（Available online: 5 November 2013）