Recent Research Interests

My research interests focus on the fields of behavioral contract theory. My research includes investigations into design of incentive mechanisms and organizational structures. 

Selected Publications

  • “Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences,” with Takeshi Murooka, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 25, pp.958-989, 2016.
  • “Public Infrastructures, Production Organizations, and Economic Development,” with Ken Tabata, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 38, pp.330-346, 2013.
  • “Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion,” with Kimiyuki Morita, Takeshi Murooka, and Masahiro Ogawa, Economics Letters, Vol. 121, pp.35–38, 2013.
  • “Formal and Relational Incentives in a Multitask Model,” International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.26, Issue 3, pp.380-394, 2006.
  • “Peer Pressure and Incentives,” Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol.58, No.1, pp.51-60, 2006.

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